David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 77 (4):477-500 (2010)
According to Marr, a computational-level theory consists of two elements, the what and the why . This article highlights the distinct role of the Why element in the computational analysis of vision. Three theses are advanced: ( a ) that the Why element plays an explanatory role in computational-level theories, ( b ) that its goal is to explain why the computed function (specified by the What element) is appropriate for a given visual task, and ( c ) that the explanation consists in showing that the functional relations between the representing cells are similar to the “external” mathematical relations between the entities that these cells represent. *Received September 2009; revised January 2010. †To contact the author, please write to: Departments of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91905, Israel; e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Carl F. Craver (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture. Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and Psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
Citations of this work BETA
Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini (2016). The Cognitive Neuroscience Revolution. Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.
William Bechtel & Oron Shagrir (2015). The Non‐Redundant Contributions of Marr's Three Levels of Analysis for Explaining Information‐Processing Mechanisms. Topics in Cognitive Science 7 (2):312-322.
M. Chirimuuta (2014). Minimal Models and Canonical Neural Computations: The Distinctness of Computational Explanation in Neuroscience. Synthese 191 (2):127-153.
William Bechtel (2016). Investigating Neural Representations: The Tale of Place Cells. Synthese 193 (5):1287-1321.
Frances Egan (2013). How to Think About Mental Content. Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.
Similar books and articles
P. Morton (1993). Supervenience and Computational Explanation in Vision Theory. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99.
Paul Bohan Broderick, Johannes Lenhard & Arnold Silverberg (2006). Dispositional Versus Epistemic Causality. Minds and Machines 16 (3).
Lawrence A. Shapiro (1997). A Clearer Vision. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.
Lawrence A. Shapiro (1993). Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr's Theory of Vision. Philosophical Review 102 (4):489-513.
Oron Shagrir (2001). Content, Computation and Externalism. Mind 110 (438):369-400.
P. S. Kitcher (1988). Marr's Computational Theory of Vision. Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.
Mark Rollins (1994). Perception and Proper Explanatory Width. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:437 - 445.
Iris Rooij, Cory D. Wright & Todd Wareham (2012). Intractability and the Use of Heuristics in Psychological Explanations. Synthese 187 (2):471-487.
Peter A. Morton (1988). Marr's Theory of Vision and the Argument From Success. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:154 - 161.
Oron Shagrir (2006). Why We View the Brain as a Computer. Synthese 153 (3):393-416.
Austen Clark (1984). Seeing and Summing: Implications of Computational Theories of Vision. Cognition and Brain Theory 7 (1):1-23.
Daniel Gilman (1996). Optimization and Simplicity: Computational Vision and Biological Explanation. Synthese 107 (3):293 - 323.
Daniel J. Gilman (1993). Optimization and Simplicity: Marr's Theory of Vision and Biological Explanation. Synthese 107 (3):293-323.
Patricia Smith Churchland (1982). Is the Visual System as Smart as It Looks? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:541 - 552.
Jonathan St B. T. Evans (2012). Spot the Difference: Distinguishing Between Two Kinds of Processing. Mind and Society 11 (1):121-131.
Added to index2010-10-03
Total downloads51 ( #82,479 of 1,796,591 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #66,428 of 1,796,591 )
How can I increase my downloads?