More on global supervenience
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):691-701 (1999)
| Abstract | Jaegwon Kim contends that global supervenience is consistent with non-materialistic cases. Paull and Sider, Horgan, as well as Kim, attempt to defend it from these charges. It is shown here that their defense is only partially successful. Their defense meets one challenge to global supervenience-the hydrogen-atom case-but fails to meet other, `local', cases. It is suggested that the other challenges can be met if global supervenience is combined with weak supervenience. The combination of global and weak supervenience constitutes a viable picture of psychophysical relations, and is especially attractive to nonreductive materialists who are also anti-individualists | |||||||||
| Keywords | Epistemology Global Supervenience Kim, J | |||||||||
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Jaegwon Kim (1984). Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Oron Shagrir (2009). Strong Global Supervenience is Valuable. Erkenntnis 71 (3):417 - 423.
Oron Shagrir (2002). Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities, and Anti-Individualism. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):171-96.
Jaegwon Kim (1987). 'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):315-26.
Mark Moyer (2008). Weak and Global Supervenience Are Strong. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):125 - 150.
R. Cranston Paull & Theodore Sider (1992). In Defense of Global Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):833-53.
Xiaoping Chen (2011). Various Concepts of “Supervenience” and Their Relations: A Comment on Kim's Theory of Supervenience. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):316-333.
Oron Shagrir (1999). More on Global Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):691 - 701.
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