Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion
Logos and Episteme 3:653-658 (2012)
|Abstract||In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences is challenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended.|
|Keywords||Assertion Moorean sentences Approximate truth Knowledge|
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