Naïve truth-conditions and meaning
Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277 (2008)
| Abstract | Critics of attempts to explain meaning in terms of truth-conditions have tended to charge their opponents with misconceptions regarding truth. I shall argue that the 'naïve' version of the truth-conditional theory which best accounts for its resilience fails for a different and more basic reason, namely, circularity arising from the contingency of meaning. One reason why this problem has been overlooked is a tendency (noted by Dummett in a different connection) to assimilate the naïve truth-conditional theory to an idealized verificationism. | |||||||||
| Keywords | contingency of meaning Dummett verificationism | |||||||||
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