Naïve truth-conditions and meaning

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277 (2008)
Critics of attempts to explain meaning in terms of truth-conditions have tended to charge their opponents with misconceptions regarding truth. I shall argue that the 'naïve' version of the truth-conditional theory which best accounts for its resilience fails for a different and more basic reason, namely, circularity arising from the contingency of meaning. One reason why this problem has been overlooked is a tendency (noted by Dummett in a different connection) to assimilate the naïve truth-conditional theory to an idealized verificationism.
Keywords contingency of meaning  Dummett  verificationism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.523.x
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Williams (1999). Meaning and Deflationary Truth. Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):545-564.
Scott Soames (1992). Truth, Meaning, and Understanding. Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):17-35.

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