Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes

Abstract
It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’. I will argue that the notion of objective being can’t serve to explain or describe this “ofness” either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind’s ability to attain clear and distinct ideas
Keywords Descartes  intentionality  objective being  material falsity  clear and distinct ideas  ideas  Arnauld
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    References found in this work BETA
    E. Jennifer Ashworth (1988). Traditional Logic. In Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner & Eckhard Kessler (eds.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 143--72.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
    Lionel Shapiro (2010). Two Kinds of Intentionality in Locke. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):554-586.
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