David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):378-418 (2012)
It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’. I will argue that the notion of objective being can’t serve to explain or describe this “ofness” either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind’s ability to attain clear and distinct ideas.
|Keywords||Descartes intentionality objective being material falsity clear and distinct ideas ideas Arnauld|
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References found in this work BETA
John Locke (1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Tyler Burge (2007). Foundations of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Stephen Yablo (2002). Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 441-492.
Paul Hoffman (2002). Descartes's Theory of Distinction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):57-78.
Paul Hoffman (2002). Direct Realism, Intentionality, and the Objective Being of Ideas. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):163-179.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
Dermot Moran (2013). Intentionality: Some Lessons From the History of the Problem From Brentano to the Present. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.
Lionel Shapiro (2010). Two Kinds of Intentionality in Locke. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):554-586.
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