Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes

Abstract
It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’. I will argue that the notion of objective being can’t serve to explain or describe this “ofness” either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind’s ability to attain clear and distinct ideas.
Keywords Descartes  intentionality  objective being  material falsity  clear and distinct ideas  ideas  Arnauld
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00475.x
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Yablo (2002). Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 441-492.
Paul Hoffman (2002). Descartes's Theory of Distinction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):57-78.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
Lionel Shapiro (2010). Two Kinds of Intentionality in Locke. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):554-586.

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