History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):305-318 (2004)
In this paper the strategy for the eliminative reduction of the alethic modalities suggested by John Venn is outlined and it is shown to anticipate certain related contemporary empiricistic and nominalistic projects. Venn attempted to reduce the alethic modalities to probabilities, and thus suggested a promising solution to the nagging issue of the inclusion of modal statements in empiricistic philosophical systems. However, despite the promise that this suggestion held for laying the ‘ghost of modality’ to rest, this general approach, tempered modal eliminativism, is shown to be inadequate for that task.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Rod Bertolet (1994). Saving Eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):87-100.
Ari Maunu (2006). Alethic Statements Are Not Intensional. Teorema 25 (3):53-61.
Casey O'Callaghan (2008). Seeing What You Hear: Cross-Modal Illusions and Perception. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):316-338.
Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Modal Scepticism, Unqualified Modality, and Modal Kinds. Philosophia 40 (2):403-409.
Robert Lockie (2003). Transcendental Arguments Against Eliminativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):569-589.
John Chidgey (1979). On the Non-Availability of Dawson-Modeling Into Certain Relevance Alethic Modal Logics. Studia Logica 38 (2):89 - 94.
Christina Schneider (1994). Probability: A New Logico-Semantical Approach. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 25 (1):107 - 124.
John Mccarthy (1997). Modality, Si! Modal Logic, No! Studia Logica 59 (1):29-32.
Added to index2009-08-05
Total downloads5 ( #160,239 of 549,017 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?