Platonizing the abstract self
| Abstract | In this note I examine the two main differences between Plato's and Dennett's views of the self as an abstract object. I point out that in the presence of certain forms of ontological realism, abstract-object theories of the self are compatible with the full reality of the self. I conclude with some remarks on the relationship between ontology and ethics. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesDaniel A. Kaufman (2002). Composite Objects and the Abstract/Concrete Distinction. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:215-238.
Bernard Linsky (2005). Remarks on Platonized Naturalism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):3-15.
Anthony Everett (2007). Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.
Mark Balaguer, Platonism in Metaphysics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Brian Leftow (1990). Is God an Abstract Object? Noûs 24 (4):581-598.
Sarah Sawyer (2002). Abstract Artifacts in Pretence. Philosophical Papers 31 (2):183-198.
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