Representations - senses and reasons

Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):355-74 (1991)
Abstract
Abstract A survey of different senses of the term ?representation? is presented. The presentation is guided by the appraisal that this key term is employed in the cognitive literature in different senses and that the distinction between these is not always explicitly stated or appreciated. Furthermore, the different senses seem to be associated with different rationales for the postulation of representation. Given that there may be a lack of convergence between the various senses of the construct in question and the rationales for its postulation, a clear differentiation of these may be crucial for any evaluation of the role of representations in cognition and in cognitive theory
Keywords Psychology  Reasons  Representation  Science  Sense
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,493
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.

View all 24 references

Citations of this work BETA
Benny Shanon (1991). Representations - Senses and Reasons. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):355-74.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

13 ( #123,286 of 1,102,513 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #85,420 of 1,102,513 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.