Reasons Wrong and Right

The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrong’ kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons wherever it appears. In this article I argue that two recent proposals for solving the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem do not work. I then offer an alternative solution that provides a unified, systematic explanation of the difference between the two kinds of reasons
Keywords wrong kind of reasons  reasons  fitting attitudes  constitutivism  rationality
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12089
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Nathaniel P. Sharadin (2015). Nothing but the Evidential Considerations? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.

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