Strong global supervenience is valuable

Erkenntnis 71 (3):417 - 423 (2009)
It is generally assumed that everything that can be said about dependence with the notion of strong global supervenience can also be said with the notion of strong supervenience. It is argued here, however, that strong global supervenience has a metaphysically distinctive role to play. It is shown that when the relevant sets include relations , strong global supervenience and strong supervenience are distinct. It is then concluded that there are claims about dependence of relations that can be made with the global notion of strong supervenience but not with the “local” (individual) one.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/40267447
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1984). Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Terence E. Horgan (1982). Supervenience and Microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):29-43.
Karen Bennett (2004). Global Supervenience and Dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):501-529.
Robert Stalnaker (1996). Varieties of Supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives 10:221-42.
Theodore Sider (1999). Global Supervenience and Identity Across Times and Worlds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (4):913-937.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

45 ( #74,438 of 1,725,572 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #81,232 of 1,725,572 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.