Philosophers' Imprint 6 (1):1-14 (2006)
|Abstract||Sidgwick holds that moral judgments are claims about what it is reasonable to do. He also holds that these judgments about what it is reasonable to do can motivate. He must, then, respond to Hume’s argument that reason cannot motivate. I clarify Sidgwick’s claims, give his argument against Hume, and reply to various Humean objections.|
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