Structural Representations and the Brain

Abstract
In Representation Reconsidered , William Ramsey suggests that the notion of structural representation is posited by classical theories of cognition, but not by the ‘newer accounts’ (e.g. connectionist modeling). I challenge the assertion about the newer accounts. I argue that the newer accounts also posit structural representations; in fact, the notion plays a key theoretical role in the current computational approaches in cognitive neuroscience. The argument rests on a close examination of computational work on the oculomotor system
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    M. Sprevak (2011). William M. Ramsey * Representation Reconsidered. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):669-675.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles
    Lawrence A. Shapiro (1997). Junk Representations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):345-361.
    William Goodwin (2010). How Do Structural Formulas Embody the Theory of Organic Chemistry? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):621-633.
    Emiliano Boccardi (2009). Who's Driving the Syntactic Engine? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):23 - 50.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-01-20

    Total downloads

    39 ( #37,013 of 1,089,047 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,722 of 1,089,047 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.