David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 7 (3):321-44 (1997)
This paper challenges two orthodox theses: (a) that computational processes must be algorithmic; and (b) that all computed functions must be Turing-computable. Section 2 advances the claim that the works in computability theory, including Turing's analysis of the effective computable functions, do not substantiate the two theses. It is then shown (Section 3) that we can describe a system that computes a number-theoretic function which is not Turing-computable. The argument against the first thesis proceeds in two stages. It is first shown (Section 4) that whether a process is algorithmic depends on the way we describe the process. It is then argued (Section 5) that systems compute even if their processes are not described as algorithmic. The paper concludes with a suggestion for a semantic approach to computation
|Keywords||Algorithm Computationalism Science Turing Machines|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Computation Without Representation. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
Emiliano Boccardi (2009). Who's Driving the Syntactic Engine? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):23 - 50.
Achim Hoffmann (2010). Can Machines Think? An Old Question Reformulated. Minds and Machines 20 (2):203-212.
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