The fate of the direct argument and the case for incompatibilism

Philosophical Studies 150 (3):405-424 (2010)
In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy. The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there are limits to what causal versions can accomplish, they can be used to buttress the ultimacy argument, another important argument for incompatibilism.
Keywords Incompatibilism  Direct argument  Determinism  Moral responsibility  Transfer principle  Ultimate responsibility  Michael McKenna
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Seth Shabo (2010). Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.

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