The guru, the logician, and the deflationist: Truth and logical consequence

Noûs 37 (1):113–132 (2003)
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present a thought experiment and argument that spells trouble for “radical” deflationism concerning meaning and truth such as that advocated by the staunch nominalist Hartry Field. The thought experiment does not sit well with any view that limits a truth predicate to sentences understood by a given speaker or to sentences in (or translatable into) a given language, unless that language is universal. The scenario in question concerns sentences that are not understood but are known to be logical consequences of known and understood sentences. Ultimately, the issue turns on the notion of logical consequence that is available to various versions of deflationism.
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    References found in this work BETA
    H. Field (1986). The Deflationary Conception of Truth. In G. MacDonald & C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality. Blackwell. 55-117.

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