David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 37 (1):113–132 (2003)
The purpose of this paper is to present a thought experiment and argument that spells trouble for “radical” deflationism concerning meaning and truth such as that advocated by the staunch nominalist Hartry Field. The thought experiment does not sit well with any view that limits a truth predicate to sentences understood by a given speaker or to sentences in (or translatable into) a given language, unless that language is universal. The scenario in question concerns sentences that are not understood but are known to be logical consequences of known and understood sentences. Ultimately, the issue turns on the notion of logical consequence that is available to various versions of deflationism.
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References found in this work BETA
Marian David (1994). Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth. Oxford University Press.
H. Field (1986). The Deflationary Conception of Truth. In G. MacDonald & C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science and Morality. Blackwell. 55-117.
Hartry Field (1994). Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse. Philosophical Review 103 (3):405-452.
Hartry Field (1994). Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content. Mind 103 (411):249-285.
Hartry Field (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Bradley Armour-Garb (2012). Deflationism (About Theories of Truth). Philosophy Compass 7 (4):267-277.
Edwin Mares & Francesco Paoli (2014). Logical Consequence and the Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):439-469.
Claire Horisk (2005). What Should Deflationism Be When It Grows Up? Philosophical Studies 125 (3):371 - 397.
Jeff Foss (2009). The Scientific Explanation of Colour Qualia. Dialogue 48 (03):479-.
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