The Mind Incarnate

MIT Press (2004)
Abstract
Shapiro tests these hypotheses against two rivals, the mental constraint thesis and the embodied mind thesis. Collecting evidence from a variety of sources (e.g., neuroscience, evolutionary theory, and embodied cognition) he concludes that the multiple realizability thesis, accepted by most philosophers as a virtual truism, is much less obvious than commonly assumed, and that there is even stronger reason to give up the separability thesis. In contrast to views of mind that tempt us to see the mind as simply being resident in a brain or body, Shapiro argues for a far more encompassing integration of mind, brain, and body than philosophers have supposed. (publisher, edited)
Keywords Body  Brain  Metaphysics  Mind
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ISBN(s) 0262693305   0262194961   9780262693301
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    Max Kistler (2010). Mechanisms and Downward Causation. Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):595-609.

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