David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Social Epistemology 20 (1):41 – 54 (2006)
It is a commonplace belief that many beliefs, e.g. religious convictions, are a purely private matter, and this is meant in some way to serve as a defense against certain forms of criticism. In this paper it is argued that this thesis is false, and that belief is really often a public matter. This argument, the publicity of belief argument, depends on one of the most compelling and central thesis of Peircean pragmatism. This crucial thesis is that bona fide belief cannot be separated from action. It is then also suggested that we should accept a form of W. K. Clifford's evidentialism. When these theses are jointly accepted in conjunction with the basic principle of ethics that it is prima facie wrong to act in such a way that may subject others to serious but unnecessary and avoidable harm, it follows that many beliefs are morally wrong.
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Ryle (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
John Heil (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford University Press.
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
Alvin Plantinga (2000). Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford University Press.
L. Jonathan Cohen (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. New York: Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael J. Shaffer (2007). Bealer on the Autonomy of Philosophical and Scientific Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 38 (1):44–54.
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