Three Problematic Theories of Conditional Acceptance
Graduate studies at Western
Logos and Episteme 2 (1):117-125 (2011)
|Abstract||In this paper it is argued that three of the most prominent theories of conditional acceptance face very serious problems. David Lewis' concept of imaging, the Ramsey test and Jonathan Bennett's recent hybrid view all face viscous regresses, or they either employ unanalyzed components or depend upon an implausibly strong version of doxastic voluntarism.|
|Keywords||Conditionals Doxastic Voluntarism Ramset Test|
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