David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383 (2010)
...I defend the uncompromising position against both Kane’s compromise source position and the traditional, “leeway” view. In sections 1 and 2, I take up Kane’s argument that uncompromising source incompatibilists go too far in their rejection of avoidability. In seeing where this argument goes wrong, we will also see why the compromise position is untenable…With the field thus narrowed, I turn to the leeway camp. Here the source incompatibilist’s task is to show that the ultimacy rationale for incompatibilism holds its own against its more familiar and better-understood predecessor. In section 3, a significant gap in existing expositions is addressed. So far, source incompatibilists have not adequately explained or defended their premise that no one is the ultimate source of her actions under determinism… When this gap is closed, however, another looms larger. The second gap concerns the source incompatibilist’s other premise: that moral responsibility requires ultimate sourcehood… In light of this worry, source incompatibilists need a more direct answer than they have so far provided to the question, “Why does moral responsibility require ultimate sourcehood?” I present such an answer in Section 4…
|Keywords||Kane incompatibilism ultimate sourcehood leeway|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (2006). Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism. Noûs 40 (2):307-330.
John Martin Fischer (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Citations of this work BETA
Seth Shabo (2011). Why Free Will Remains a Mystery. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.
Seth Shabo (2012). Compatibilism and Moral Claimancy: An Intermediate Path to Appropriate Blame. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):158-186.
Derk Pereboom (2009). Hard Incompatibilism and its Rivals. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.
Michael McKenna (2009). Compatibilism & Desert: Critical Comments on Four Views on Free Will. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):3 - 13.
Seth Shabo (2011). What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove? Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.
Similar books and articles
Joseph Keim Campbell (2006). Farewell to Direct Source Incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4):36 - 49.
Eric Yang (2012). Defending Direct Source Incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 27 (3):325-333.
Bernard Berofsky (2006). The Myth of Source. Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.
Michael S. McKenna (2001). Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):37-51.
Charles Hermes & Joe Campbell (2012). More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (3):335-344.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Incompatibilism's Threat to Worldly Value: Source Incompatibilism, Desert, and Pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):621-645.
John J. Davenport (2007). Augustine on Liberty of the Higher-Order Will. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:67-89.
Jason Turner (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.
Kevin Timpe (2007). Source Incompatibilism and its Alternatives. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):284-299.
Added to index2010-03-16
Total downloads74 ( #20,696 of 1,101,953 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #68,246 of 1,101,953 )
How can I increase my downloads?