Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383 (2010)
|Abstract||...I defend the uncompromising position against both Kane’s compromise source position and the traditional, “leeway” view. In sections 1 and 2, I take up Kane’s argument that uncompromising source incompatibilists go too far in their rejection of avoidability. In seeing where this argument goes wrong, we will also see why the compromise position is untenable…With the field thus narrowed, I turn to the leeway camp. Here the source incompatibilist’s task is to show that the ultimacy rationale for incompatibilism holds its own against its more familiar and better-understood predecessor. In section 3, a significant gap in existing expositions is addressed. So far, source incompatibilists have not adequately explained or defended their premise that no one is the ultimate source of her actions under determinism… When this gap is closed, however, another looms larger. The second gap concerns the source incompatibilist’s other premise: that moral responsibility requires ultimate sourcehood… In light of this worry, source incompatibilists need a more direct answer than they have so far provided to the question, “Why does moral responsibility require ultimate sourcehood?” I present such an answer in Section 4…|
|Keywords||Kane incompatibilism ultimate sourcehood leeway|
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