Why anti-realists and classical mathematicians cannot get along
Topoi 20 (1) (2001)
| Abstract | Famously, Michael Dummett argues that considerations concerning the role of language in communication lead to the rejection of classical logic in favor of intuitionistic logic. Potentially, this results in massive revisions of established mathematics. Recently, Neil Tennant (“The law of excluded middle is synthetic a priori, if valid”, Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), 205-229) suggested that a Dummettian anti-realist can accept the law of excluded middle as a synthetic, a priori principle grounded on a metaphysical principle of determinacy. This article shows that the for the anti-realist, the law of excluded middle entails that humans have wildly implausible abilities. The proposed synthesis between anti-realism and classical mathematics thus fails. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,865 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Josh Parsons & Jon Cogburn (2005). Wrestling with (and Without) Dialetheism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):87 – 102.
Imogen Dickie (forthcoming). Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence. Philosophical Studies.
Jon Cogburn (2005). The Logic of Logical Revision Formalizing Dummett's Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):15 – 32.
Bernhard Weiss (2007). Truth and the Enigma of Knowability. Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
Robert G. Hudson (2009). Faint-Hearted Anti-Realism and Knowability. Philosophia 37 (3).
Neil Tennant (1996). The Law of Excluded Middle Is Synthetic A Priori, If Valid. Philosophical Topics 24 (1):205-229.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads29 ( #43,119 of 556,803 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,803 )How can I increase my downloads? |

