David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio Juris 22 (3):326-338 (2009)
In this paper, I present a new argument against inclusive legal positivism. As I show, any theory which permits morality to be a condition on legality cannot account for a core feature of legal activity, namely, that it is an activity of social planning. If the aim of a legal institution is to guide the conduct of the community through plans, it would be self-defeating if the existence of these plans could only be determined through deliberation on the merits. I also argue that, insofar as inclusive legal positivism was developed as a response to Ronald Dworkin's critique of H. L. A. Hart's theory of law, it was founded on a mistake. For once we appreciate the role that planning plays in legal regulation, we will see that Dworkin's objection is based on a flawed conception of legal obligations and rights and hence does not present an objection that inclusive legal positivists were required to answer.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Jules L. Coleman (2001). The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory. Oxford University Press.
H. L. A. Hart (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford University Press.
Joseph Raz (1985). Authority, Law and Morality. The Monist 68 (3):295-324.
Citations of this work BETA
Miguel-Jose Lopez-Lorenzo (2012). The Planning Theory of Law. Res Publica 18 (2):201-206.
John Eekelaar (2012). Positivism and Plural Legal Systems. Ratio Juris 25 (4):513-526.
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