David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371 (2011)
Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the problem with the arguments is supposed to be. I suggest three possibilities, arguing that none proves to be well founded. I conclude that the scope of these arguments is fully adequate for their defenders’ purposes.
|Keywords||Incompatibilism Direct Argument Indirect Argument Campbell Fischer|
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References found in this work BETA
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
Peter van Inwagen (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Peter van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Joseph Keim Campbell (2007). Free Will and the Necessity of the Past. Analysis 67 (294):105-111.
Seth Shabo (2010). Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.
Citations of this work BETA
Seth Shabo (2011). Why Free Will Remains a Mystery. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.
Seth Shabo (2013). Free Will and Mystery: Looking Past the Mind Argument. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.
Justin A. Capes (2016). Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1477-1495.
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