Analogy counterarguments and the acceptability of analogical hypotheses
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):477-496 (2002)
| Abstract | The logical empiricists held that an analogical hypothesis does not gain any acceptability from the analogy on which it is founded. On this view, the acceptability of a hypothesis cannot be discounted by criticizing the foundational analogy. Yet scientists commonly appear to level exactly this sort of criticism. If scientists are able to discount the acceptability of analogical hypotheses in this way, then the logical empiricist view is mistaken. I analyze four forms of analogy counterargument, disanalogy, misanalogy, counteranalogy, and false analogy, with examples from the debate over the asteroid impact hypothesis. These counterarguments do address the acceptability of analogical hypotheses, indicating that analogies can confer acceptability, confirmation notwithstanding. 1 Introduction 2 The asteroid impact hypothesis 3 Analogy counterarguments 3.1 Disanalogy 3.2 Misanalogy 3.3 Counteranalogy 3.4 False analogy 4 Acceptability 5 Conclusions. | |||||||||
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Lindley Darden (1982). Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy of Science: Reasoning by Analogy in Theory Construction. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:147 - 165.
Allison Barnes & Paul R. Thagard (1997). Empathy and Analogy. Dialogue 36 (4):705-720.
Antonio Donato (2003). The Role of Focus in Aquinas's Doctrine of Analogy. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 77:289-301.
Steven A. Long (2011). Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith. University of Notre Dame Press.
Roberto Festa (1996). Analogy and Exchangeability in Predictive Inferences. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):229 - 252.
Mary Hesse (1964). Analogy and Confirmation Theory. Philosophy of Science 31 (4):319-327.
Paul F. A. Bartha (2010). By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical Arguments. Oxford University Press.
Cameron Shelley (2004). Analogy Counterarguments: A Taxonomy for Critical Thinking. Argumentation 18 (2):223-238.
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