Biopower, Styles of Reasoning, and What's Still Missing from the Stem Cell Debates

Hypatia 25 (3):577 - 609 (2010)
Abstract
Until now, philosophical debate about human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has forgely been limited to its ethical dimensions and implications. Although the importance and urgency of these ethical debates should not be underestimated, the almost undivided attention that mainstream and feminist philosophers have paid to the ethical dimensions of hESC research suggests that the only philosophically interesting questions and concerns about it are by and hrge ethical in nature. My argument goes some distance to challenge the assumption that ethical considerations ahne must be foregrounded in philosophical discussions about hESC research by introducing a critical stance on the epistemological and ontological assumptions that underlie and condition it. A central aim of the paper is to show how Foucault's insights into knowledge-power, taken in combination with Hacking's claims about styks of reasoning, can make these assumptions evident, as well as cast light on their potentially deletenous implications for disabled people. Arguing in this way also enables me to draw out constitutive effects of research on stem cells, that is, to indicate how the discursive practices sunounding research on stem cells, as well as the technology itself, contribute to the constitution of impairment
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    R. Amundson (2000). Against Normal Function. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 31 (1):33-53.

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