David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology:1-18 (forthcoming)
In this paper I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3 I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent’s long-standing and endorsed motivations, values, and character traits. Results indicate that conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits. In section 4 I contrast the absence or presence of consciousness in behaviorally identical agents. Most participants attribute free will to conscious agents, but not to nonconscious agents. Focusing in particular on two leading views of free will and moral responsibility, namely, Deep Self and Reasons-Responsive Views, I argue these results present philosophers of mind and action with the following explanatory burden: develop a substantive theory of the connection between consciousness on the one hand and free will and moral responsibility on the other that takes folk views on this connection seriously.
|Keywords||Experimental Philosophy Consciousness Free Will|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Added to index2014-05-17
Total downloads98 ( #11,960 of 1,102,835 )
Recent downloads (6 months)98 ( #456 of 1,102,835 )
How can I increase my downloads?