David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):929-946 (2015)
In this paper, I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3, I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent's long-standing and endorsed motivations, values, and character traits. Results indicate that conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits. In section 4, I contrast the absence of consciousness with the presence of consciousness in behaviorally identical agents. Most participants attribute free will to conscious agents, but not to nonconscious agents. Focusing in particular on two leading views of free will and moral responsibility, namely, Deep Self and Reasons-Responsive Views, I argue that these results present philosophers of mind and action with the following explanatory burden: develop a substantive theory of the connection between consciousness on the on..
|Keywords||Experimental Philosophy Consciousness Free Will|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Susan Wolf (1990). Freedom Within Reason. Oxford University Press.
Angela M. Smith (2005). Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life. Ethics 115 (2):236-271.
Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Joshua Shepherd (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: Experimental Studies. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):915-927.
Carrie Figdor & Mark Phelan (2015). Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility?: A Case for Rethinking Their Relationship and the Design of Experimental Studies in Moral Psychology. Mind and Language 30 (5):603-627.
Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2005). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.
Timothy O'Connor, Free Will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Manuel Vargas (2006). Philosophy and the Folk: On Some Implications of Experimental Work For Philosophical Debates on Free Will. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1):239-254.
Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray (2010). Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions. In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan 189--215.
Adam Feltz & Florian Cova (2014). Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis. Consciousness and Cognition 30:234-246.
Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran (2007). Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.
Eddy Nahmias (2012). Free Will and Responsibility. WIREs Cognitive Science 3 (4):439-449.
Stephen G. Morris (2014). Commentary on “The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism”. Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):802-807.
Robyn Repko Waller (2012). Beyond Button Presses: The Neuroscience of Free and Morally Appraisable Actions. The Monist 95 (3):441-462.
P. S. Greenspan (1999). Impulse and Self-Reflection: Frankfurtian Responsibility Versus Free Will. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 3 (4):325-341.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2015). Everyone Thinks That an Ability to Do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.
Joseph Keim Campbell (2011). Free Will. Polity Press.
Robert N. Audi (1974). Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (January):1-14.
Added to index2014-05-17
Total downloads278 ( #8,953 of 1,934,852 )
Recent downloads (6 months)37 ( #14,826 of 1,934,852 )
How can I increase my downloads?