Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental?

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213 (2003)
In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism.
Keywords Anomalism  Externalism  Mental  Metaphysics  Rationality  Davidson, D
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00306
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References found in this work BETA
Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
Jaegwon Kim (1984). Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.

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