Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213 (2003)
|Abstract||In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualiﬁed ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism.|
|Keywords||Anomalism Externalism Mental Metaphysics Rationality Davidson, D|
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