David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 27 (4):466-493 (2012)
The concept of innateness is used to make inferences between various better-understood properties, like developmental canalization, evolutionary adaptation, heritability, species-typicality, and so on (‘innateness-related properties’). This article uses a recently-developed account of the representational content carried by inheritance systems like the genome to explain why innateness-related properties cluster together, especially in non-human organisms. Although inferences between innateness-related properties are deductively invalid, and lead to false conclusions in many actual cases, where some aspect of a phenotypic trait develops in reliance on a genetic representation it will tend, better than chance, to have many of the innateness-related properties. The account also shows why inferences between innateness-related properties sometimes fail and argues that such inferences are especially misleading when applied to human psychology and behaviour because human psychological development is especially reliant on non-genetic inherited representations
|Keywords||innateness genetic information genetic representation inherited information evolution development developmental systems theory Lorenz Lehrman psychobiology|
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Citations of this work BETA
Oliver M. Lean (2014). Getting the Most Out of Shannon Information. Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):395-413.
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (forthcoming). Innateness as a Natural Cognitive Kind. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
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