David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):385-401 (2012)
This paper raises fundamental questions about the claims of art historian David Freedberg and neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese in their article "Motion, Emotion and Empathy in Esthetic Experience." It does so from several perspectives, all of them rooted in the dynamic realities of movement. It shows on the basis of neuroscientific research how connectivity and pruning are of unmistakable import in the interneuronal dynamic patternings in the human brain from birth onward. In effect, it shows that mirror neurons are contingent on morphology and corporeal-kinetic tactile-kinesthetic experience. Accordingly, it poses and answers the overlooked but seminally important question of how mirror neurons come to be. The original neuromuscular research of Parma neuroscientists and the findings of Marc Jeannerod concerning kinesthesia support the answer that the "underpinnings" of visual art appreciation are themselves underpinned. An abbreviated phenomenological analysis of movement and its implications regarding the fact that the making of all art is quintessentially contingent on movement, hence a dynamic enterprise, further bolster the given answer as does a brief review of an empirical phenomenological analysis of the natural dynamic congruency of emotions and movement. In the end, the paper shows that movement and life are of a piece in the creation and appreciation of art as in everyday life.
|Keywords||Developmental neuronal brain dynamics Morphology Corporeal-kinetic tactile-kinesthetic invariants Aesthetic experience Dance Kinesthesia Emotions|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Roberto Casati & Alessandro Pignocchi (2007). Mirror and Canonical Neurons Are Not Constitutive of Aesthetic Responses. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (10):000-000.
David Freedberg & Vittorio Gallese (2007). Motion, Emotion and Empathy in Esthetic Experience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (5):197-203.
Raymond W. Gibbs (2006). Embodiment and Cognitive Science. New York ;Cambridge University Press.
Edmund Husserl (1964/1965). Cartesian Meditations. [The Hague]M. Nijhoff.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Dieter Lohmar (2006). Mirror Neurons and the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):5-16.
Lawrence Shapiro (2009). Making Sense of Mirror Neurons. Synthese 167 (3):439 - 456.
Emma Borg (2007). If Mirror Neurons Are the Answer, What Was the Question? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):5-19.
Shannon Spaulding (2012). Mirror Neurons Are Not Evidence for the Simulation Theory. Synthese 189 (3):515-534.
Shannon Spaulding (2013). Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition. Mind and Language 28 (2):233-257.
Chris A. Kramer (2012). As If: Connecting Phenomenology, Mirror Neurons, Empathy, and Laughter. Phaenex 7 (1):275-308.
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2012). From Movement to Dance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (1):39-57.
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2011). The Primacy of Movement. John Benjamins Pub..
Maxim I. Stamenov & Vittorio Gallese (eds.) (2002). Mirror Neurons and the Evolution of Brain and Language. John Benjamins.
Dr John R. Skoyles (2008). Why Our Brains Cherish Humanity: Mirror Neurons and Colamus Humanitatem. Cogprints.
Giacomo Rizzolatti & Corrado Sinigaglia (2007). Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions. OUP Oxford.
Added to index2011-12-03
Total downloads94 ( #12,403 of 1,101,182 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #44,374 of 1,101,182 )
How can I increase my downloads?