Tarski's thesis
| Abstract | “Tarski’s Thesis” is the claim that a certain invariance condition can serve as our criterion of logicality. My goal in this paper is to explain the thesis, provide it with a philosophical justification, and respond to three recent criticisms due to Solomon Feferman. | |||||||||
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