Weak and strong theories of truth
Studia Logica 68 (1):89-101 (2001)
| Abstract | A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength. | |||||||||
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