David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophia 36 (2):223-226 (2008)
In his response to my essay “Out of Control,” Neil Levy contests my claims that (1) we are often responsible for acts that we do not consciously choose to perform, and that (2) despite the absence of conscious choice, there remains a relevant sense in which these actions are within our control. In this reply to Levy, I concede that claim (2) is linguistically awkward but defend the thought that it expresses, and I clarify my defense of claim (1) by distinguishing my position from attributionism
|Keywords||Responsibility Control Neil Levy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil Levy (2013). The Importance of Awareness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):221-229.
Stephen Kershnar (2015). Moral Responsibility and Foundationalism. Philosophia 43 (2):381-402.
Similar books and articles
Neil Levy (2007). The Social: A Missing Term in the Debate Over Addiction and Voluntary Control. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):35 – 36.
Nicholas Agar (2012). On the Irrationality of Mind-Uploading: A Rely to Neil Levy. [REVIEW] AI and Society 27 (4):431-436.
Neil Levy & Timothy J. Bayne (2004). A Will of One's Own: Consciousness, Control, and Character. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):459-470.
Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna (2011). Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.
Bennett Foddy & Julian Savulescu (2006). Autonomy, Addiction and the Drive to Pleasure: Designing Drugs and Our Biology: A Reply to Neil Levy. Bioethics 20 (1):21–23.
Neil Levy (2008). Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher. [REVIEW] Philosophia 36 (2):213-221.
Neil Levy (2011). Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Neil Levy (2004). Why Frankfurt Examples Don't Beg the Question: A Reply to Woodward. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (2):211–215.
Neil Levy & Yasuko Kitano (2011). We're All Folk: An Interview with Neil Levy About Experimental Philosophy and Conceptual Analysis. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 19:87-98.
Neil Levy (2009). Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick. Ethics 119 (4):729-741.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads68 ( #50,109 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #118,705 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?