Against Credibility

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):1 - 18 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

How does the monitoring of a testifier's credibility by recipients of testimony bear upon the epistemic licence accruing to a recipient's belief in the testifier's communications? According to an intuitive and philosophically influential conception, licensed acceptance of testimony requires that recipients of testimony monitor testifiers with respect to their credibility. I argue that this conception, however, proves to be untenable when confronted with the wealth of empirical evidence bearing on the ways in which testifiers and their interlocutors actually interact.

Similar books and articles

Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Sanford Goldberg & David Henderson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):600 - 617.
Group testimony.Deborah Tollefsen - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
Gender and trust in science.Kristina Rolin - 2002 - Hypatia 17 (4):95-118.
Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals.Steven L. Reynolds - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.
Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge.Robert Audi - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):507-531.
Aesthetic testimony: What can we learn from others about beauty and art?Aaron Meskin - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):65–91.
Knowledge on Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Credibility and credulity: Monitoring teachers for trustworthiness.William Hare - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (2):207–219.
Testimony as Evidence.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - Philosophica 78 (2).

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-03-27

Downloads
1,025 (#11,598)

6 months
80 (#48,157)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joseph Shieber
Lafayette College

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 47 references / Add more references