An unnoticed flaw in Barker and Achinstein's solution to Goodman's new Riddle of induction

Philosophy of Science 48 (4):611-617 (1981)
Barker and Achinstein misread Goodman's definitions of 'grue' and 'bleen'. If we stick to Goodman's definition of 'grue' as applying "to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue" (my italics), and his parallel definition of 'bleen', then Barker and Achinstein's arguments are seen to be irrelevant. The result is to by-pass the question whether Mr. Grue sees things as grue rather than as green while showing that it is possible for human conceptual schemes to employ different sensory terms. These two issues are separate
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DOI 10.1086/289025
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