David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215 (2011)
According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.” According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can vary despite constancy in representational content
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Citations of this work BETA
Jeff Yoshimi & David W. Vinson (2015). Extending Gurwitsch’s Field Theory of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 34:104-123.
Matt Bower (2014). Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-Representational Phenomenology. Husserl Studies 30 (3):225-245.
Kenneth Williford (2013). Husserl's Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
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