Philosophical Studies 25 (January):73-75 (1974)
|Abstract||In "mind-Body identity, Privacy and categories" richard rorty set forth a new form of the identity theory of the mind, (called the 'disappearance' version) in which he suggested that instead of identifying sensations with neural events, Sensations might be eliminated. Using an illustration of rorty's I show that 'pain' cannot come to refer to a brain process for neural events are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. For 'pain' to refer to something unpleasant, We would have to give 'brain process' the connotation of unpleasantness. But to do this would be to identify the brain process with the sensation of pain--I.E., To return to the older identity theory|
|Keywords||Body Identity Mental Act Metaphysics Minds Sensation Rorty, R|
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