Soul as Subject in Aristotle's De Anima

Classical Quarterly 38 (01):140- (1988)
In the largely historical and aporetic first book of the De Anima , Aristotle makes what appear to be some rather disturbing remarks about the soul's status as a subject of mental states. Most notably, in a curious passage which has aroused the interest of commentators, he seems to suggest that there is something wrong with regarding the soul as a subject of mental states: Thus, saying that the soul is angry is the same as if one were to say that the soul builds houses and weaves: for it is perhaps better to say not that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does [these things] with his soul
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DOI 10.1017/S0009838800031359
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Michael V. Wedin (1993). Content and Cause in the Aristotelian Mind. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (S1):49-105.

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