The forgotten individual: diagrammatic reasoning in mathematics

Synthese 186 (1):149-168 (2012)
Parallelism has been drawn between modes of representation and problem-sloving processes: Diagrams are more useful for brainstorming while symbolic representation is more welcomed in a formal proof. The paper gets to the root of this clear-cut dualistic picture and argues that the strength of diagrammatic reasoning in the brainstorming process does not have to be abandoned at the stage of proof, but instead should be appreciated and could be preserved in mathematical proofs
Keywords Diagrammatic reasoning  Token fallacy  Formalization  Generalization  Individualization
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0075-1
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References found in this work BETA
I. Kant (1984). Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Sun-Joo Shin & Giovanna Corsi (1997). The Logical Status of Diagrams. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):290-291.

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Iulian D. Toader (2004). On Frege's Logical Diagrams. In A. Blackwell, K. Marriott & A. Shimojima (eds.), Diagrammatic Representation and Inference. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer 22-25.

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