The forgotten individual: diagrammatic reasoning in mathematics

Synthese 186 (1):149-168 (2012)
Abstract
Parallelism has been drawn between modes of representation and problem-sloving processes: Diagrams are more useful for brainstorming while symbolic representation is more welcomed in a formal proof. The paper gets to the root of this clear-cut dualistic picture and argues that the strength of diagrammatic reasoning in the brainstorming process does not have to be abandoned at the stage of proof, but instead should be appreciated and could be preserved in mathematical proofs
Keywords Diagrammatic reasoning  Token fallacy  Formalization  Generalization  Individualization
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0075-1
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References found in this work BETA
I. Kant (1984). Critique of Pure Reason. Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Sun-Joo Shin & Giovanna Corsi (1997). The Logical Status of Diagrams. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):290-291.

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Jay Zeman (1997). The Tinctures and Implicit Quantification Over Worlds. In Paul Forster & Jacqueline Brunning (eds.), The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of C.S. Peirce. University of Toronto Press 96-119.

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