Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3):324-333 (1998)
|Abstract||In this paper I attempt to clarify a relatively little-studied aspect of Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism: its use of the notion of ‘undecidable’ sentence. I give a new analysis of this concept in epistemic terms, with which I resolve some puzzles and questions about how it works in the anti-realist critique of classical logic.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Benjamin Murphy, Michael Dummett. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bernhard Weiss (2007). Truth and the Enigma of Knowability. Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
William Child (2007). Dreaming, Calculating, Thinking: Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism About the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):252–272.
Sanford Shieh (1998). On the Conceptual Foundations of Anti-Realism. Synthese 115 (1):33-70.
Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2005). Antirealism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy. Noûs 39 (1):123–139.
Neil Tennant (1987). Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as Eternal. Oxford University Press.
Mari Mikkola (2010). Is Everything Relative? Anti-Realism, Truth and Feminism. In A. Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics.
C. S. Jenkins (2007). Anti-Realism and Epistemic Accessibility. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):525 - 551.
Rupert Read (2002). Is ‘What is Time?’ A Good Question to Ask? Philosophy 77 (2):193-210.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads22 ( #62,675 of 722,864 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,864 )
How can I increase my downloads?