Abnormality, cognitive virtues, and knowledge

Synthese 163 (1):99 - 118 (2008)
Abstract
Causal analyses of one’s knowing that p have recently emphasized the involvement of cognitive virtues in coming to believe that p. John Greco suggests that in order to deal with Gettier-type cases, a virtue analysis of knowing should include a requirement that one’s knowing does not in a certain way involve abnormality. Yet Greco’s emphasis on statistical abnormality either renders his analysis subject to a generality problem or to objections regarding certain Gettier-type cases. When we instead consider abnormality in the sense of a causally differentiating factor in relation to a causal contrast situation, the account remains unclear concerning its application to an interesting non-Gettier-type case concerning chance. The exploration of these shortcomings casts doubt on the epistemological usefulness of the schema, ‘If you know, then there is no abnormality in your being right.’.
Keywords Knowledge  Gettier  Greco  Abnormal  Causal judgments  Causal selection  Contrast situation  Lottery  Cognitive virtue  Differentiating factor  Castañeda  Lehrer
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    References found in this work BETA
    Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
    Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    John Greco (2009). Knowledge and Success From Ability. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):17 - 26.
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