Boomerang defense of rule following

Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):115-122 (1992)
Can there be a good argument for the total denial of rule following? The question concerns the "total" denial, where the targeted rules include those meta-rules presumably required for philosophical argumentation. In this paper the author contends that such a self-undermining argument can never be a good argument even in a "reductio ad absurdum" form, but that the defender of rule following cannot dismiss a challenge on this ground when the opponent adopts "the virus strategy"
Keywords Argument  Language  Laws  Logic  Nihilism  Relativism  Rule  Scepticism  Kripke, S
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb00640.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,046
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
T. Shogenji (1993). Modest Scepticism About Rule-Following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):486-500.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

25 ( #162,776 of 1,934,445 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #76,845 of 1,934,445 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.