Graduate studies at Western
Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):115-122 (1992)
|Abstract||Can there be a good argument for the total denial of rule following? The question concerns the "total" denial, where the targeted rules include those meta-rules presumably required for philosophical argumentation. In this paper the author contends that such a self-undermining argument can never be a good argument even in a "reductio ad absurdum" form, but that the defender of rule following cannot dismiss a challenge on this ground when the opponent adopts "the virus strategy"|
|Keywords||Argument Language Laws Logic Nihilism Relativism Rule Scepticism Kripke, S|
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