David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):67-85 (2006)
For a view which grounds norms in the practices of a particular group, determining who is in that group will determine the scope of those norms. Such a view requires an account of what it is to be a member of the group subject to that practice. In this article, the author presents the beginnings of such an account, limiting his inquiry to discursive practices; we might characterize such practices as those which require, as a condition of participation, participants both to exchange reasons with one another and to recognize that practice as a common source of reasons. The author argues that membership in such groups is constituted by the conjunction of shared discursive practices, common recognition of the authority of that practice, and commitments between members. In the case of discursive practices, these features of membership are inseparable. Key Words: practice commitment membership discursive stance.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Suzy Killmister (2011). Group-Differentiated Rights and the Problem of Membership. Social Theory and Practice 37 (2):227-255.
James R. Beebe (2001). Interpretation and Epistemic Evaluation in Goldman's Descriptive Epistemology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (2):163-186.
Giuseppe Mininni (2005). Focus: Complexityandpsychology Guest Editors: Giuseppe Mininni and Mauro Maldonato. World Futures 61 (3):165 – 173.
David Lauer (2012). Expressivism and the Layer Cake Picture of Discursive Practice. Philosophia 40 (1):55-73.
Lynne Tirrell (1997). Language and Power. In Alison M. Jaggar & Iris Marion Young (eds.), A Companion to Feminist Philosophy,. Blackwell.
Tanja Pritzlaff (2012). Disagreement, Error and Two Senses of Incompatibility—The Relational Function of Discursive Updating. Philosophia 40 (1):121-138.
Eva Bendix Petersen (2008). The Conduct of Concern: Exclusionary Discursive Practices and Subject Positions in Academia. Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (3):394–406.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #143,992 of 1,101,856 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #306,556 of 1,101,856 )
How can I increase my downloads?