David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324 (2008)
The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”: if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person. The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick” properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles
|Keywords||Neo-Lockean view Animalism Coincident entities Persistence conditions Psychological continuity Brain/cerebrum transplant “is” of identity “is” of constitution Thin property Thick property Too many minds problem Microphysical states of affairs Biological animal|
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Derek Parfit (2012). We Are Not Human Beings. Philosophy 87 (01):5-28.
Andrew M. Bailey (2015). Animalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Tim Campbell & Jeff McMahan (2010). Animalism and the Varieties of Conjoined Twinning. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301.
Eric T. Olson (2011). The Extended Self. Minds and Machines 21 (4):481-495.
Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2013). Bodily Thought and the Corpse Problem. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):575-592.
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Eric T. Olson (forthcoming). The Remnant-Person Problem. In Stephan Blatti Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press
Theodore Sider (2002). Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):45-48.
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