David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):99-124 (2011)
In this paper, I attempt to show that the moral/conventional distinction simply cannot bear the sort of weight many theorists have placed on it for determining the moral and criminal responsibility of psychopaths. After revealing the fractured nature of the distinction, I go on to suggest how one aspect of it may remain relevant—in a way that has previously been unappreciated—to discussions of the responsibility of psychopaths. In particular, after offering an alternative explanation of the available data on psychopaths and their judgments of various sorts of norm transgressions, I put forward a hybrid theory of their responsibility, suggesting how they might be criminally responsible, while nevertheless failing to meet the conditions for an important arena of moral responsibility.
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References found in this work BETA
Matthew Talbert (2008). Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil Levy (2013). Psychopaths and Blame: The Argument From Content. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-17.
Chad Van Schoelandt (2015). Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public Reason. Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1031-1050.
Gerald Gaus (2014). The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Three Agent-Type Challenges to The Order of Public Reason. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):563-577.
David Shoemaker (2013). Qualities of Will. Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):95-120.
Marion Godman & Anneli Jefferson (forthcoming). On Blaming and Punishing Psychopaths. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-16.
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