Reductionist contractualism: Moral motivation and the expanding self

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):343-370 (2000)
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Abstract

According to a popular contemporary contractualist account of moral motivation, the most plausible explanation for why those who are concerned with morality take moral reasons seriously — why these reasons strike those who are moved by them with a particular inescapability — is that they stem from, and are grounded by, a desire to be able to justify one’s actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject.1 My

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David Shoemaker
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Moral motivation.Connie S. Rosati - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists.Kristie Miller - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):567-593.
The Selves of Social Animals: Comments on Gruen.David Shoemaker - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):66-74.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Moral saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.
The schizophrenia of modern ethical theories.Michael Stocker - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (14):453-466.
Contractualism and utilitarianism.Thomas M. Scanlon - 1982 - In Amartya Kumar Sen & Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press. pp. 103--128.

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