Realization, micro-realization, and coincidence

Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in which mental properties can be realized in thin physical properties shared by a person and her body. Defining this in turn requires defining a sense in which the instantiations of sortal properties and of thick properties are realized in micro-structural states of affairs. A fourth notion of realization is needed to allow for the possibility of coincident entities that share a sortal property, e.g., coincident persons
Keywords Coincidence  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Property  Realization
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00023.x
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References found in this work BETA
Sydney Shoemaker (1980). Causality and Properties. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel 109-35.

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Citations of this work BETA
Thomas W. Polger (2007). Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.

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