David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):1-23 (2003)
Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in which mental properties can be realized in thin physical properties shared by a person and her body. Defining this in turn requires defining a sense in which the instantiations of sortal properties and of thick properties are realized in micro-structural states of affairs. A fourth notion of realization is needed to allow for the possibility of coincident entities that share a sortal property, e.g., coincident persons
|Keywords||Coincidence Metaphysics Physicalism Property Realization|
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Citations of this work BETA
Karen Bennett (2011). Construction Area (No Hard Hat Required). Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.
L. A. Paul (2010). The Puzzles of Material Constitution. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):579-590.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2010). The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir (2010). Functionalism and Thinking Animals. Philosophical Studies 147 (3):347 - 354.
Dean W. Zimmerman (2009). Properties, Minds, and Bodies: An Examination of Sydney Shoemaker's Metaphysics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):673-738.
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