Responsibility Without Identity

Harvard Revieiw of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132 (2012)
It is taken to be platitude that I can be responsible only for my own actions. Many have taken this to entail the slogan that responsibility presupposes personal identity. In this paper, I show that even if we grant the platitude, the slogan is not entailed and is at any rate false. I then suggest what the relevant non-identity relation grounding the ownership of actions consists in instead.
Keywords moral responsibility  personal identity  narrative identity  four-dimensionalism  attributability
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI harvardreview20121816
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,675
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Marya Schechtman (2011). Memory and Identity. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):65-79.
Deborah C. Smith (2001). Parfit on Personal Identity. Idealistic Studies 31 (2/3):169-181.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

111 ( #37,847 of 2,121,929 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

17 ( #29,217 of 2,121,929 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.