Responsibility Without Identity

Harvard Revieiw of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132 (2012)
Abstract
It is taken to be platitude that I can be responsible only for my own actions. Many have taken this to entail the slogan that responsibility presupposes personal identity. In this paper, I show that even if we grant the platitude, the slogan is not entailed and is at any rate false. I then suggest what the relevant non-identity relation grounding the ownership of actions consists in instead.
Keywords moral responsibility  personal identity  narrative identity  four-dimensionalism  attributability
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