David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):391-419 (1999)
offers each of these as a possible moral unit at various points.1 It is the aim of this paper, however, to suggest that, if Parﬁt’s two key arguments about the indeterminacy of identity and what matters in our identity are correct, we should take selves to be the signiﬁcant moral units in any metaphysically-grounded ethical theory. Furthermore, because Parﬁt’s own explanation of what the concept of the self involves is problematic in important respects, I hope to point out a few ways in which this concept might be made clearer and more coherent. Finally, I will defend this intermediate view from objections stemming from each of the other two alternatives. I begin with a brief exposition of the Parﬁtian model
|Keywords||Ethics Metaphysics Self Unit Parfit, D|
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Andrew C. Khoury (2013). Synchronic and Diachronic Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):735-752.
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