Selves and moral units

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):391-419 (1999)
offers each of these as a possible moral unit at various points.1 It is the aim of this paper, however, to suggest that, if Parfit’s two key arguments about the indeterminacy of identity and what matters in our identity are correct, we should take selves to be the significant moral units in any metaphysically-grounded ethical theory. Furthermore, because Parfit’s own explanation of what the concept of the self involves is problematic in important respects, I hope to point out a few ways in which this concept might be made clearer and more coherent. Finally, I will defend this intermediate view from objections stemming from each of the other two alternatives. I begin with a brief exposition of the Parfitian model
Keywords Ethics  Metaphysics  Self  Unit  Parfit, D
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00091
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,209
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Jacob Ross (2014). Divided We Fall. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):222-262.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

83 ( #56,843 of 1,941,042 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

15 ( #56,734 of 1,941,042 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.