David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 184 (1):29-48 (2012)
This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that any measure of epistemic justification is also a measure of incremental confirmation. However, the degree of epistemic justification must meet an additional condition, and all known measures of incremental confirmation fail to meet it. I describe this additional condition as well as a measure that meets it. The paper then applies the measure to the conjunction fallacy and proposes an explanation of the fallacy.
|Keywords||Degree of justification Degree of confidence Degree of confirmation Information Conjunction fallacy Bayesian epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
David Marr (1982). Vision. Freeman.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
David Marr (1982). Vison. W. H. Freeman.
Tomoji Shogenji (1999). Is Coherence Truth Conducive? Analysis 59 (4):338–345.
Citations of this work BETA
Joshua Shepherd & James Justus (2015). X-Phi and Carnapian Explication. Erkenntnis 80 (2):381-402.
Roberto Festa (2012). “For Unto Every One That Hath Shall Be Given”. Matthew Properties for Incremental Confirmation. Synthese 184 (1):89-100.
William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji (2013). Confirmation, Transitivity, and Moore: The Screening-Off Approach. Philosophical Studies (3):1-21.
Jakob Koscholke (2016). Evaluating Test Cases for Probabilistic Measures of Coherence. Erkenntnis 81 (1):155-181.
Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori (2014). State of the Field: Measuring Information and Confirmation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.
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