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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
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Cambridge University Press (1996)
Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like to have them. Amongst the other topics covered are the unity of consciousness, and the idea that the 'first-person perspective' gives a privileged route to philosophical understanding of the nature of mind. This major collection is sure to prove invaluable to all advanced students of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
|Keywords||Philosophy of mind Self (Philosophy Consciousness Perspective (Philosophy|
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|Call number||BD418.3.S54 1996|
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Carruthers (2009). How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.
Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
Laura Klaming & Pim Haselager (2013). Did My Brain Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Action and Mental Competence. Neuroethics 6 (3):527-539.
Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Similar books and articles
Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
Sydney Shoemaker (1996). Unity of Consciousness and Consciousness of Unity. In The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press
Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag
Thomas Natsoulas (2001). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Attempted Inroads From the First Person Perspective. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):219-248.
Michael Pauen (2012). The Second-Person Perspective. Inquiry 55 (1):33 - 49.
Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The First-Person Perspective. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (2):7-22.
Guido Melchior (2011). Privileges of First-Person Reference and of Third-Person Reference. Acta Analytica 26 (1):37-52.
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