David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):391-419 (1999)
Derek Parfit claims that, at certain times and places, the metaphysical units he labels *'selves" may be thought of as the morally significant units (I.e., the objects of moral concern) for such things as resource distribution, moral responsibility, commitments, etc. But his concept of the self is problematic in important respects, and it remains unclear just why and how this entity should count as a moral unit in the first place. In developing a view I call *'Moderate Reductionism," I attempt to resolve these worries, first by offering a clearer, more consistent account of what the concept of *'self ' should involve, and second by arguing for why selves should indeed be viewed as moral (and prudential) units. I then defend this view in detail from both *'conservative" and *'extreme" objections.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
David W. Shoemaker (1999). Selves and Moral Units. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):391-419.
David Walton (1991). The Units of Selection and the Bases of Selection. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):417-435.
Bradley E. Wilson (1996). Changing Conceptions of Species. Biology and Philosophy 11 (3):405-420.
Christopher D. Horvath (1997). Discussion: Phylogenetic Species Concept: Pluralism, Monism, and History. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):225-232.
J. Dupre (2001). In Defence of Classification. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 32 (2):203-219.
Luke Robinson (2006). Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism. Mind 115 (458):331-360.
Timothy Shanahan (1990). Evolution, Phenotypic Selection, and the Units of Selection. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):210-225.
Mariam Thalos (1999). Units of Decision. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):338.
Andrew Cullison (2010). Moral Perception. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
Lei Zhong (2012). An Explanatory Challenge to Moral Reductionism. Theoria 78 (4):309-325.
Edward C. Halper (2011). Klein on Aristotle on Number. New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 11:271-281.
Robert C. Neville (1987). Units of Change: Units of Value. Philosophy East and West 37 (2):131-134.
Elisabeth A. Lloyd (1989). A Structural Approach to Defining Units of Selection. Philosophy of Science 56 (3):395-418.
Andranick Tanguiane (1995). Notes as Acoustical Units of Musical Communication. In M. G. Boroda (ed.), Units, Text and Language: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Universitätsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads13 ( #125,816 of 1,100,121 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #66,996 of 1,100,121 )
How can I increase my downloads?